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Capital structure is closely related to corporate operation, governance, development and 
future planning. Since late 20th century, a large number of studies have proposed a series of 
capital structure theory, forming a system to explain the theory of capital structure from multiple 
angles. Meanwhile, a large number of empirical analysis of the factors affecting capital 
structure decisions provide evidence for these theories.  
At very beginning, the researches only focused on determinants at the company-level. From 
microeconomic point of view, investigators found that firm-specific factors such as firm size, 
profitability, growth and other variables may affect the company's choice of capital structure. 
In recent years, more and more studies pay attention to the macroeconomic aspect. For 
example, Korajczyk and Levy (2003) capture the macroeconomic environment in terms of three 
variables: the corporate profit growth rate, equity market returns, and the excess returns of 
commercial paper, to analyze how macroeconomic conditions and financial constraints affect 
capital structure choice. Cook and Tang (2010) studied the macroeconomic conditions and 
capital structure adjustment speed. Macroeconomic conditions have been found to be important 
factors in analyzing firms' financing choices. 
The purpose of this thesis is to give empirical analysis on the relationship between business 
cycle and capital structure choice. However, we examine not only business cycle, but also how 
other specific macroeconomic and microeconomic variables affect companies’ financing 
decisions collectively.  
This thesis chooses the gaming industry and automotive industry in the U.S. stock market as 
research subject. Both two industries are highly sensitive to the business cycle due to their own 
specific characteristics.  
The paper uses panel data model as estimation method, which can provide information on 
individual behavior, both across individuals and over time. The data and models have both 
cross-sectional and time-series dimensions. Panel data can be balanced when all individuals are 
observed in all time periods or unbalanced when individuals are not observed in all time periods. 
This thesis mainly has parts of three chapters including the second chapter, the third chapter 
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and the fourth chapter. The first two can be categorized as a theoretical part, and the last one is 
about the empirical part. 
In the second chapter, basic theories of capital structure and current situation of target 
industries are introduced in detail. Hypotheses about the research results are made in this 
chapter based on those theories. 
The third chapter provides knowledge of the methodology of panel data model. Then, we 
construct the model according to acquired information. Moreover, the analysis of sample data 
is also presented in this chapter. 
We run the commands of panel data model estimation in Stata and then display the outputs 
in the fourth chapter. By the end of this chapter, the final results will be gathered together and 
discussed elaborately. 
In the fifth, also known as the last chapter, we summarize the full text about the research on 
business cycle and capital structure choices, draw a conclusion, and proposes some questions 
need to discuss and research further.   
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2 Prior research review and hypotheses 
The capital structure of a company can be defined as the composition of its capitalization and 
it includes all kinds of capital resources, such as debt, stocks, and equity. 
This chapter first examines the modern theories of capital structure, from the theoretical 
Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorems devised by Modigliani and Miller in 1958 to the two of the 
extended popular theories—the statistic trade-off theory and the pecking order hypothesis. Then, 
prior researches related to factors affecting companies’ capital structures are reviewed and 
introduced in detail. After that, the author provides analysis to the overall status of the U.S. 
market as well as targeting industries based on some official reports. With these as the basis, 
hypotheses are made in the final section of this chapter with applications of the aforesaid 
theories. 
2.1 Theoretical basis 
The capital structure of a company is the founding stone for the daily development of its 
operation, and for a further planning of the business. To understand the capital structure choice 
of firms, we need the help of basic theories introduced hereinafter. 
The development of capital structure theory can be defined as two stages. The first stage is 
the period of old theories, which contains traditional capital structure theory and modern capital 
structure theory. The second stage is the period of new capital structure theories. 
The traditional capital structure theory was formed before 1950s, mainly represented by net 
income theory (NI), net operating income theory (NOI) and the traditional theory (David 
Durand, 1952). This is the embryonic stage of capital structure theory. It is a kind of inference 
about the behavior of corporate management, mainly based on empirical judgment only. There 
is no theoretical deduction and statistical analysis of scientific system, but it also provides 
direction for the latter development of capital structure theory.  
The classical MM theory put forward in 1958 marks the establishment of modern capital 
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structure theory. The modern capital structure theory focuses on the reasons and process for the 
formation of the target capital structure.  
With the development of economic theory, especially the in-depth study in economics of 
information, at the end of 1970s, asymmetric information theory began to be applied to 
corporate financing decisions, and gradually formed some new capital structure theories, 
mainly are agency costs theory, pecking order theory, market timing theory, and so on. These 
theories provide us with more perspectives on understanding the company's capital structure. 
After decades of development and continuous integration with other economic theories, 
capital structure theory has formed a certain system. Some of the theories are wildly applied in 
prior empirical researches, for example the MM theory, the trade-off theory and pecking order 
theory. In this section, we mainly focus on these three theories. 
2.1.1 The Modigliani-Miller Theorem 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposed the well-known theory of capital structure—MM 
theory: in a completely effective market without any taxation, if the total amount of funds for 
forming a company is certain, then the value of a company with or without financial leverage 
are exactly equal, meaning that capital structure has nothing to do with corporate value under 
such circumstance. 
The earliest MM theory was proposed for a perfect market under strict but usually unrealistic 
assumptions, among which the no-tax assumption is the key. However, if we move to the real 
world where there are taxes, as Fernandes and Nuno (2014) suggest, when the interest on debt 
is tax-deductible, and ignoring other frictions, the value of the company increases in proportion 
to the amount of debt used. And the source of additional value is due to the amount of taxes 
saved by issuing debt instead of equity.   
In order to address some of the imperfections in the real-world market situation, the 
assumptions made in the MM model have to be relaxed, so as to take into consideration the 
impact of corporate income tax on the capital structure. Modified MM theories were therefore 
developed with taxation being the primary reason for the capital structure to actually matter in 
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reality. Such modified theory mainly states that corporate liabilities can act as a tax shield, and 
tax shields can increase the value of a company. This is because debt interest can be deducted 
before tax, which also forms a tax-deductible income, so the company's debt can increase the 
company's market value under certain circumstances. Meanwhile, the more corporate debt, the 
stronger the action of the tax shield, and the higher the market value of the company.  
Since the MM theory has been come up with, the research on the factors affecting the capital 
structure of enterprises has developed rapidly, and the theory of capital structure has been 
continuously enriched, followed by a large number of empirical studies using the data of listed 
companies as samples. 
2.1.2 The Trade-Off Theory  
From the perspective of funding sources, the financing methods of enterprises can be divided 
into internal financing and external financing. Internal funds refer to the funds generated by the 
business activities of the enterprise, that is, the funds that are internally financed by the 
enterprise, including retained earnings and depreciation. Internal funds form a company’s seed 
money with the characteristics of low cost, autonomy, and anti-risk. The pecking order 
hypothesis states that companies choose internal funds preferentially to meet the capital needs 
of enterprises. Then, with the expansion of production scale and investment, when the needs 
exceed the threshold, the company raises the funds through external channels, to fill the 
remaining part.  
External financing refers to the way in which enterprises raise funds from other economic 
entities. It mainly consists of equity financing and debt financing. Furthermore, debt financing 
can be divided into bond financing, bank loans, and trust financing. 
The thought that static trade-off theory considers that corporate with higher operational risk 
would have higher bankruptcy costs, therefore, needs to lower its debt level, put forward by 
Haley and Schall (1979). 
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2.1.3 The Pecking Order Theory 
Base on the assumption of perfect capital market in MM theory, Myers and Majluf (1984) 
put forward the pecking order theory following the findings of Donaldson (1961) which 
discovered that management internally generated funds instead of using external funds. Pecking 
order theory holds that there is information asymmetry between inside management and 
investors in the valuation of the enterprise, which leads to the game between the two parties, 
making the enterprise have obvious financing order preference. That is, internal financing, debt 
financing, and equity financing as the last resort. Myers and Majluf (1984) also fund that, equity 
is the last option for financing externally due to the fact that current shareholders are not willing 
to share the benefit of investment or decline the share price. The theory also holds that when a 
firm isn’t able to generate sufficient funds internally to fulfill its investment needs, it will 
choose to borrow more debt. 
2.2 Prior researches 
As has been mentioned in the previous section, since the proposal of the MM theory, the 
research on the factors affecting the capital structure choice of enterprises has developed rapidly. 
With time going by, the theory of capital structure has been enriched, followed by a large 
number of empirical studies based on the data of listed companies as samples. In this section, 
we review and sort out the research literatures on the factors affecting capital structure into 
company characteristic category and macroeconomic category. 
2.2.1 Company characteristic factors affect capital structure choices 
Marsh (1982) concludes that the company's size is positively related to the capital structure. 
He selects companies of different sizes, focuses on analyzing the company's long-term and 
short-term debt ratios, and find that as the company's size increased, the company's debt ratio 
also increased. He believes that the larger the company, the more it prefers to choose long-term 
debt, because the long-term debt leads to the economies of scale that can reduce the company's 
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financing costs; on the contrary, small-size companies prefer to choose short-term debt because 
small companies face higher bankruptcy risks. And long-term debt will bring higher financing 
costs. 
Kester (1986) selects companies in Japan and the United States as samples to conduct an 
empirical analysis of the company's financial leverage. He chooses the debt-to-equity ratio to 
represent financial leverage, and uses profitability, growth, and company size as explanatory 
variables, while using industry and country as dummy variables. Through linear regression 
results, it is found that profitability and company size are negatively correlated with financial 
leverage, while growth is positively correlated with financial leverage. 
Howe (1988), based on the perspective of agency cost, analyzes and concludes that 
profitability is positively correlated with asset-liability ratio. He believes that corporate debt 
can force managers to use corporate profits to pay interest on debt, thus acting as a constraint 
on the management. Therefore, the higher the company's profitability, the higher its asset-
liability ratio, which restricts the company's management's arbitrary decision to a certain extent 
and safeguards the company's interests. 
Titman and Wesdssels (1982) select US manufacturing listed companies as research objects 
and empirically analyzed the factors affecting capital structure. They find that factors such as 
profitability, company size, growth, asset cover ability, non-debt tax shield and operational 
capability will affect the capital structure of listed companies. 
Wald (1999) uses Tobit regression and the method that debt/asset ratios are regressed on the 
determinants of capital structure to study the data of non-public utilities and non-financial 
companies in France, Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. It is found 
that the ratio of net fixed assets to total assets was positively correlate with company’s leverage.  
Non-debt tax shields, R&D expenses as a percentage of sales revenue, and profitability are 
inversely related to leverage ratios. The study also discovers that the relationships between risk, 
company size, inventory to total assets ratio and capital structure are vary from country to 
country. This indicates that the institutions may also be a significant determinant of capital 
structure, and the agency costs of countries may also be different.  
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2.2.2 Macroeconomic factors affect capital structure choices 
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) argue that inflation has a major impact on a company's capital 
structure. When inflation increases, the real cost of debt financing will decrease, so the company 
will increase its liabilities to reduce financing costs; when inflation eases, lower stock market 
returns will prompt the company's management to choose corporate bonds with higher yields. 
That will also increase the company's liabilities. Therefore, inflation is positively correlated 
with corporate debt ratio. 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) study the impact of interest rates and inflation rates on capital 
structure based on agency costs and management risk perspectives. They believe that changes 
in inflation and interest rates will change the tax shield revenue and the company's bankruptcy 
costs, thus affecting the company's capital structure. 
A survey by Graham and Harvey (2001) shows that one-third of US manufacturing 
companies consider the impact of macroeconomic factors such as interest rates and inflation 
rates in their financial decisions. The report also confirms the impact of macroeconomic factors 
on the company's capital structure. 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) analyze the impact of macroeconomic factors on the capital 
structure of listed companies from the perspective of financial constraints. They find that 
regardless of whether the company's finances are constrained, the impact of macroeconomic 
factors on the company's capital structure is significant. At the same time, the study also find 
that if the company's financial constraints are high, the financial leverage is subject to a counter-
cyclical change; if the financial constraints are low or the financial is not constrained, the 
financial leverage is subject to a cyclical change. 
Booth (2001) uses empirical cross-sectional data from developed and developing countries 
for empirical analysis. He focuses on the impacts of macroeconomic variables such as stock 
market value as a percentage of GDP, real GDP growth rate, bank loan-to-GDP ratio, and 
inflation rate on capital structure. The results of the study show that these macroeconomic 
variables have a significant impact on 27.5% of corporate debt ratio changes in 17 countries, 
with a significant impact on 22.4% of companies' long-term debt ratio changes in 16 countries. 
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He found that the ratio of bank loans to GDP, real GDP growth rate were positively correlated 
to the company's asset-liability ratio, while stock value as a percentage of GDP and inflation 
rate were negatively correlated with the company's asset-liability ratio. Booth's research shows 
that the macroeconomic environment significantly affects the company's capital structure. 
The study by Hackbarth et al. (2006) shows that if the changes in the macroeconomic 
environment have a great impact on the company's operating cash flow, the company will adjust 
its capital structure along with the macroeconomic environment changes. To this end, they 
construct a stochastic theoretical model. The results show that when the macroeconomic 
environment is good, the company's debt financing increases greatly. At the same time, the 
better macroeconomic environment prompts the company to adjust the capital structure more 
frequently. But the rangeability of adjustment is found to be smaller than when the economy is 
in recession. 
2.3 Market overview 
In this thesis we focus our attention on specific industries in the U.S. market. In this section, 
we give the macroeconomic situation of U.S. a glance by illustrating real gross domestic 
product and its change over time. And then we introduce the overall leverage level of all 
companies listed in the U.S. market, and compare it with other markets. 
Table 2.1: U.S. real gross domestic product from FQ1 2007 to FQ4 2017 
t Real GDP Growth Rate t Real GDP Growth Rate 
FQ1 2007 15493.33 - FQ3 2012 16220.67 0.13% 
FQ2 2007 15582.09 0.57% FQ4 2012 16239.14 0.11% 
FQ3 2007 15666.74 0.54% FQ1 2013 16382.96 0.89% 
FQ4 2007 15761.97 0.61% FQ2 2013 16403.18 0.12% 
FQ1 2008 15671.38 -0.57% FQ3 2013 16531.69 0.78% 
FQ2 2008 15752.31 0.52% FQ4 2013 16663.65 0.80% 
FQ3 2008 15667.03 -0.54% FQ1 2014 16621.70 -0.25% 
FQ4 2008 15328.03 -2.16% FQ2 2014 16830.11 1.25% 
FQ1 2009 15155.94 -1.12% FQ3 2014 17033.57 1.21% 
FQ2 2009 15134.12 -0.14% FQ4 2014 17113.95 0.47% 
FQ3 2009 15189.22 0.36% FQ1 2015 17254.74 0.82% 
FQ4 2009 15356.06 1.10% FQ2 2015 17397.03 0.82% 
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Table 2.1 (continued) 
FQ1 2010 15415.15 0.38% FQ3 2015 17438.80 0.24% 
FQ2 2010 15557.28 0.92% FQ4 2015 17456.23 0.10% 
FQ3 2010 15671.97 0.74% FQ1 2016 17523.37 0.38% 
FQ4 2010 15750.63 0.50% FQ2 2016 17622.49 0.57% 
FQ1 2011 15712.75 -0.24% FQ3 2016 17706.71 0.48% 
FQ2 2011 15825.10 0.71% FQ4 2016 17784.19 0.44% 
FQ3 2011 15820.70 -0.03% FQ1 2017 17863.02 0.44% 
FQ4 2011 16004.11 1.16% FQ2 2017 17995.15 0.74% 
FQ1 2012 16129.42 0.78% FQ3 2017 18120.84 0.70% 
FQ2 2012 16198.81 0.43% FQ4 2017 18223.76 0.57% 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Chart 2.1: U.S. real gross domestic product from FQ1 2007 to FQ4 2017 
  
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
Real gross domestic product (GDP) shows an overall increasing trend with small quarterly 
fluctuations from FQ1 2017 to FQ4 2017. The GDP growth rate measures how fast the economy 
is growing, by comparing one fiscal quarter of GDP to the previous fiscal quarter. The real GDP 
significantly decreased in 2008 due to the financial crises. Since FQ3 2009, the real GDP 
increased steadily, only experienced very slightly drop in FQ1 2011, FQ3 2011 and FQ1 2014. 
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Table 2.2: Book value debt ratio of companies in different markets 
 
US Europe Global 
2013 63.460% 66.748% 58.901% 
2014 61.572% 64.582% 57.287% 
2015 62.633% 64.302% 57.621% 
2016 63.211% 63.246% 57.423% 
2017 62.783% 60.350% 56.396% 
Source: Damodaran online, data: archives 
Chart 2.2: Book value debt ratio of companies in different markets 
 
Source: Damodaran online, data: archives 
Table 2.2 shows aggregate book leverage ratios for all firms and industries in the dataset 
created by Aswath Damodaran. Aggregate book debt-to-capital ratio is a measurement of a 
company's financial leverage, which is defined each year as the cross-section sum of the 
company's interest-bearing debt, both short- and long-term liabilities, divided by total capital. 
Total capital is all interest-bearing debt plus shareholders' equity, which may include items such 
as common stock, preferred stock, and minority interest. Chart 2.2 examines the trends in 
aggregate book debt-to-capital ratio of firms in U.S., European, and global markets.  
The table and chart above illustrate that from 2013 to 2017, the mean leverage of all firms 
globally is fairly low, lower than either of US and European markets. It shows a downward 
trend, ranging from 58.901% to 56.396%. From 2013 to 2017, Book leverage of European 















leverage decreased approximately 3%. The leverage of US market decreased from 63.460% in 
2013 to 61.572% in 2014, however, from 2014 to 2016, it increased significantly to.63.211%, 
nearly reaching the peak of 63.460% in 2013. Though it slightly dropped in 2017, the leverage 
of US market surpassed European market. Since 2017, US has replaced Europe and became the 
market in which companies have the highest leverage. 
Table 2.2 and Chart 2.2 together serves well to illustrate that in recent years, the integral 
leverage level of companies listed in U.S. market was relatively high and became the highest 
compared to Europe and Global in 2017. 
2.4 Actuality of targeting industries 
2.4.1 The U.S. gaming industry 
In line with the new study, Economic Impact of the US Gaming Industry, from oxford 
economics, the American gaming industry has significant impact on the economy as a powerful 
economic engine and a dynamic job creator. It provides nearly 1.8 million jobs across the 
country and contributes $261 billion to the U.S. economy. According to the 2018 State of State 
report released by American Gaming Association (AGA), the total revenue of the commercial 
gaming industry in 2017 was $40.28 billion. The tax payment totaled up to $9.23 billion to the 
state. The report shows there was 20 commercial casino states experienced revenue increases 
in 2017, reflecting strong macroeconomic trends and sustained job growth in most parts of the 
country.  
  A distinct feature of the U.S. gaming industry mentioned by Schwartz and Christiansen (2012) 
is that some companies’ debt load grew massively from 2005 to 2009 and led the industry’s 
leverage to a historical high level. 
Horvath and Paap (2012) examine the influence of the business cycle on expenditures of 
three major types of legalized gambling activities and conclude that the casino gambling 
expenditures show a positive growth during expansions and no growth during recessions. 
Hence, the loss in income during recessions affects casino gambling. This research proves that 
17 
 
the gaming industry is sensitive to the business cycle. 
2.4.2 The U.S. automotive industry 
  According to an official report, North American automotive market continues to record 
steady growth in 2018. Automotive is one of America’s largest manufacturing industries, and 
has been considered as one of the pillar industries for a long time. Auto sales were hit by 
financial crisis in 2008, then recovered in a short time and have seen an increase by more than 
67% since the crisis ended. In 2017 alone, U.S. light vehicle sales reached 17.1 million units, 
the third straight year in which sales reached or surpassed $17 million (Ward's Automotive 
Reports, January 8, 2018). 
  At the worldwide angle, automotive is one of the world’s largest economic industries with 
regard to revenue. With the development of international trade, listed automotive companies 
are strongly dependent upon the international environment. Thus, worldwide car sales were 
also affected by the 2008 financial crisis, and fell dramatically during 2008-2009. Thanks to 
the rapid demand growth in Asian market in recent years, by far the value of automobiles sold 
has been back to the pre-crisis level. The report shows in 2017, the United States exported 
nearly 2 million new light vehicles and almost 130,000 medium and heavy trucks (valued at 
$63.2 billion) to more than 200 markets worldwide, with additional exports of automotive parts 
valued at $85.6 billion. 
  The automotive industry is identified as a capital-intensive industry that required great 
investments of money for machinery and equipment. That is to say, more debt is needed by it 
than by other industries. Therefore, the automotive industry is expected to stay at a high level 
of leverage ratio. 
In accordance with the paper, A View of Recessions, from the Automotive Industry, by Martin 
B. Zimmerman, chief economist of Ford Motor Company, the recession of the macroeconomy 
would have huge impact on the auto industry. In his opinion, the auto industry is the one that 
most cyclical and most dependent on the business cycle. Since the industry is highly sensitive 




2.5 Hypotheses  
  In this section, we state our hypotheses, trying to explain each proposition that we are 
interested in respectively by literature findings introduced in section 2.1. As the external 
environment of a firm’s financing activities, the macroeconomic environment should have an 
important impact on the capital structure choice of enterprises. This paper studies the impact of 
macroeconomic environment on the capital structure of gaming and automotive listed 
companies under the control of firm-specific factors. The macroeconomic factors in this paper 
should be mainly focused on the business cycle, credit market and stock market and other 
aspects related to capital structure. The firm specific microeconomic factors such as 
profitability, firm size, and growth should be included in as well. Moreover, through this thesis, 
we measure the capital structure as leverage ratio, using a company’s total liabilities divided by 
its total assets. 
2.5.1 Business cycle and capital structure 
  A company would have different operating capacity in different stage of business cycle. 
When during the expansion period, a company normally has higher profitability and lower 
operational risk than in recession phase. 
  As we mentioned earlier, based on the trade-off theory, a company’s capital structure would 
change along with the business cycle. Because when macroeconomy is in a boom, profitability 
that stronger than before allows company to bear greater interest burden. Meanwhile, the 
relatively low business risk would encourage the company to expand debt financing, so as to 
make full use of tax shield. Therefore, in the expansion stage, a company’s leverage will 
increase, and the value of company increases as well, and vice versa. 
  In contrast, the pecking order theory supports the idea that since the companies have a 
preference for internal financing, higher profitability and sufficient capital would lead to a 
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cutting down of the leverage ratio. Hence, under the pecking order hypothesis, the corporate 
leverage shows an anticyclical trend. Form the above, we come up with hypotheses as follows: 
Hypothesis 1a: Based on the trade-off theory, the business cycle is positively related to the 
capital structure. 
Hypothesis 1b: Based on the pecking order theory, the business cycle is negatively related to 
the capital structure. 
2.5.2 Interest rate and capital structure 
  Interest rate can be treated as the cost of debt form the corporate point of view and has great 
impact on capital market. The most direct impact of interest rate adjustment is to change the 
cost of corporate debt financing, which in turn affects the choice of financing methods and 
changes in capital structure. According to the trade-off theory, the increase in interest rate will 
increase the debt financing cost of enterprises. If the enterprise seeks the optimal capital 
structure, it will inevitably reduce the debt ratio of the enterprise to maintain the value of the 
enterprise without falling. Based on the analysis of the financing priority theory, the impact of 
rising interest rates. It is not only to improve the debt financing cost of enterprises, but also to 
reduce investors' expectations of corporate profitability, which in turn leads to a decline in 
corporate stock prices. At this time, enterprises will try to choose internal financing or reduce 
external financing, and thus the financial leverage of enterprises will decline. Therefore, both 
the trade-off theory and the theory of priority financing can explain the negative correlation 
between interest rates and the capital structure of enterprises. 
  But the interest rate we use in this thesis is the U.S. 10-year government bonds rate, instead 
of the bank lending rate. As we know, investors have a wide variety of investment choices, from 
corporate stocks to government bonds. When the yield of treasury bond (T-bonds) increases, 
investors will invest their money in bonds market instead of stock market, thereby the stock 
price may drop, and the company need to finance by debt. 
Hypothesis 2: Long-term interest rate and capital structure are positively correlated. 
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2.5.3 Profitability and capital structure 
  As mentioned earlier, according to the trade-off theory, the profitability of a profitable 
company is low, so the debt cost is expected to be low, so the leverage ratio is high (Frank & 
Goyal, 2009). In contrast, the pecking order theory predicts that higher profitability will lead to 
a decline in leverage as companies tend to use internal rather than external funds. Most 
empirical studies support the theory of foraging order (Fama & French, 2002; Titman & 
Wessels, 1998; Wald, 1999). In terms of transportation, Drobetz et al. (2013) asserts that 
profitability and leverage are inversely related. Based on all of the above and taking into 
account a unique and recognized feature of shipping, that is, the mood of the shipowner at 
different stages of the business cycle, we form the following assumptions: 
Hypothesis 3a: Based on the trade-off theory, the profitability is positively related to the capital 
structure. 
Hypothesis 3b: Based on the pecking order theory, the profitability is negatively related to the 
capital structure. 
2.5.4 Corporate size and capital structure 
According to the trade-off theory, large firms commonly own stable cash flows with high 
risk resistance capacity. Since being less likely to go bankrupt, large firms have stronger ability 
to borrow from banks with lower costs compared with small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
The larger the scale of the enterprise, the easier it is to obtain the support of the bank for credit. 
The enterprise with large size has stronger ability to integrate resources, has better credit rating, 
and therefore, is more likely to obtain loans. This result in higher leverage in large firms.  







3 Sample description and methodology 
There are three sections included in this chapter, methodology, model construction, and 
sample description. It contains all the methods and sources needed in the practical part.  
3.1 Methodology 
In accordance with empirical study on the factors affecting company’s capital structure, we 
found the panel data analysis is the most suitable method for such research. 
In this section, we introduce estimation method of panel data models, primarily focusing on 
the one-way error component regression model. 
3.1.1 Introduction 
Panel data refers to the pooling of observations on a cross-section over several time series. 
For example, as what we do in this thesis, surveying a number of firms (𝑁) and following 
them over time (𝑡). Panel data regression differs from a regular time-series or cross-section 
regression in that it has a double subscript on its variable.  
The most basic structure of panel data modelled as: 
𝑦&' = 𝑋&'𝛽 + 𝑍&𝛼 + 𝑢&',                    (3.1) 
where 𝑖 represents firms, and 𝑡 represents time. Therefore, the 𝑖 subscript denotes the cross-
section dimension, while 𝑡 denotes the time-series dimension. 𝛽 is a 𝐾 × 1 matrix, 𝑋&' is 
the 𝑖𝑡th observation on 𝐾 explanatory variables, 𝛼 is a scalar, 𝑍&𝛼 represents heterogeneity, 
and 𝑢&' is the error term. 
Primarily, we assume the panel is balanced, which means each individual 𝑖 is observed in 
all time 𝑡 . Then, for unobserved effects models the data can be generated by following 
assumptions: 
P1: Linearity  
𝐸(𝑢&') = 0 and 𝐸(𝛼&) = 0                  (3.2) 




  {𝑋&, 𝑦&}&89: 	𝑖. 𝑖. 𝑑                       (3.3) 
The observations are independent and identically distributed across individuals but not 
necessarily across time. 
P3: Strict exogeneity  
  𝐸(𝑢&'|𝑋&, 𝛼&) = 0                      (3.4) 
The error term is assumed uncorrelated with explanatory variables of the same individual, 
regardless of time. 
The strict exogeneity assumption followed by unobserved effects models can be stated in 
terms of conditional expectations as  
𝐸(𝑦&'|	𝑋&9, 𝑋&?, … , 𝑋&A, 𝛼&) = 𝐸(𝑦&'|	𝑋&', 𝛼&) = 𝑋&'𝛽 + 𝛼&.      (3.5) 
There are in general three types of panel data models: pooled regression model, fixed effects 
model and random effect model. 
(1) The pooled regression models 
It is the simplest way by pooling regression on all the observations together. In this case, it 
assumes that there is no heterogeneity: 
𝑦&' = 𝑋&'𝛽 + 𝛼 + 𝑢&'							(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇),        (3.6) 
If there is no significant difference between different individuals in terms of time or between 
different sections, then pooled ordinary least squares (Pooled OLS) estimator can be used to 
analyze this model. 
(2) The fixed effects model 
The fixed effects model is one of the unobserved effects models, the other one is random 
effects model. A key difference between these two methods is that, for random effects, 𝛼& is 
treated as a random variable, and for fixed affects, it is viewed as parameter to be estimated for 
each cross-section observation 𝑖. 
                 𝑦&' = 𝑋&'𝛽 + 𝛼& + 𝑢&'							(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇),     (3.7) 




This model assumes the individual effect 𝛼& is correlated with the independent variable 𝑋&'. 
Which means the covariance between 𝛼& and 𝑋&' should not be equal to 0. Therefore, 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼&, 𝑋&') ≠ 0.                     (3.8) 
(3) The random effects model 
In the random effect model, the individual-specific effect is a random variable that is 
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables. The model can be written as 
𝑦&' = 𝑋&'𝛽 + 𝛼& + 𝑢&'							(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇).         (3.9) 
The basic assumption of random effect is that,  
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼&, 𝑋&') = 0,                     (3.10) 
or, 
𝐸(𝛼&|	𝑋&) = 𝐸(𝛼&),                    (3.11) 
indicating the covariance between 𝛼& and the independent variable 𝑋&' has to be equal to 0. 
This assumption ensure that the random effect estimate of 𝛽 is consistent. 
3.1.2 Estimation method 
(1) Pooled OLS 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) is defined as a type of linear least squares method for 
estimating the unknown parameters in a linear regression. Pooled OLS model is one where the 
data on different units are pooled together with no assumption on individual differences and 
estimated by OLS. The model gives 
𝑦&' = 𝛽H + 𝛽9𝑋9&' + 𝛽?𝑋?&' + ⋯+ 𝛽J𝑋J&' + 𝑢&',         (3.12) 
where 𝑦&'  is the dependent variable, 𝑋J&'  is the 	𝑘 − 𝑡ℎ  explanatory variable, 𝛽J  is the 
structural parameter, 𝑘 is the number of independent variables and 𝑢&' is the error term. 
(2) Fixed effects estimator  
The fixed effects estimator is also called within OLS estimator. The main idea is to eliminate 
the unobserved effects 𝛼& (which can be added back in later), and then using Pooled OLS 
estimator on the time-demeaned variable. 
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Subtracting the time-mean of each entity away from the values of variable. Then, define the 




∑ 𝑦&'A'89 ,                             (3.13) 
Thus, for the simple regression, averaging over time gives 
𝑦N& = 𝑋N&𝛽 + 𝛼& + 𝑢N&							(𝑖 = 1,… ,𝑁; 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇)         (3.14) 
Therefore, subtracting (3.14) from the original model (3.7), we will get time-demeaned 
variable 
𝑦&' − 𝑦N& = 	𝛽(𝑋&' − 𝑋N&) + (𝑢&' − 𝑢N&),              (3.15) 
which can be rewritten as 
𝑦P&' = 	𝛽𝑋Q&' + 𝑢P&'.                        (3.16) 
(3) Random effect estimation 
The random effect estimator takes on the name of the feasible generalized least square (FGLS) 
estimator. This method involves more assumptions than those needed for Pooled OLS: 
Assumption RE1: 
a. 𝐸(𝑢&'|	𝑋&, 𝛼&) = 0, 𝑡 = 1,… , 𝑇. 
b. 𝐸(𝛼&|	𝑋&) = 𝐸(𝛼&) = 0. 
In the random effects estimation, 𝛼&  is moved into the composite error term. Now, the 
function becomes, 
𝑦&' = 𝑋&'𝛽 + 𝜈&',                          (3.17) 
𝐸(𝜈&'|	𝑋&) = 0,                          (3.18) 
where 





,                      (3.20) 
for all 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠, where 𝜎\? = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝛼&) and 𝜎^? = 𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢&'). 
Then, we can estimate it by FGLS. 
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3.1.3 Tests in panel models 
(1) Unit root test 
It is a common assumption in time series analysis that the data is stationary. Intuitively, the 
stationarity indicates that the statistical properties of a process, such as mean, variance and 
covariance, generating a time series remain unchanged over time. It can be also described as a 
flat looking series without trend, or periodic fluctuations. Stationarity can be helpful in building 
not only a permanent model, but also a more prominent one. 
Models can show different types of stationarity. The first one would be strict stationarity, 
which means that the joint distribution of any moments within the process is irrelevant with 
time. However, this definition is considered in practice too strict to be used in reality. 
The second type is called weak stationarity. Under such circumstance, time series have 
constant statistical properties (e.g. mean, variance and autocovariance) that do not change along 
with time. Other statistics in the system are free to change over time. This constrained type of 
strict stationarity is widely applied in practice. 
So before constructing the panel data model, it is initial to test the stationarity of data set by 
the help of a hypothesis test.  
The unit root, also known as the unit root process, is a stochastic trend in a time series. If a 
time series has a unit root, then it is non-stationary. Many tests exist in this area, for instance 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, Phillips-Perron (PP) test, KPSS test and so on. They 
can be used to determine if trending data should be first differenced or regressed on 
deterministic functions of time to render the data stationary.  
Consider an AR(1) model of 𝑦': 
𝑦&,' = 𝜌&𝑦&,'`9 + 𝜀&,', 𝜀&,'~𝑁(0, 𝜎?).                 (3.21) 
Unit root tests take the null hypothesis that 𝐻H:	𝜌& = 1	(𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦) against 
the alternative hypothesis that 𝐻9: |𝜌&| < 1	(𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑	𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑟𝑦).  
If 𝜌& = 1, in that way 𝑦&,' = 𝑦&,'`9 + 𝜀&,' = 𝑦H + ∑ 𝜀&,j'j89 , has a stochastic trend.  
However, for panel model, there is a series of specific panel-data unit-root tests implemented 
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in Stata. It contains the Levin–Lin–Chu (2002), Harris–Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000; 
Breitung and Das 2005), Im–Pesaran–Shin (2003), Fisher-type (Choi 2001), Hadri (2000), and 
Lagrange multiplier (LM).   
We will apply the most common test - LLC (2002) in our practice part which has as the null 
hypothesis that panel contain a unit root. Levin, Lin, and Chu propose a test which has an 
alternative hypothesis that the 𝜌& are identical and negative. Because 𝜌& is fixed across i, this 
is one of the most complicated of the tests because the data from the different individuals need 
to be combined into a single final regression. In Stata, we simply run the command of llc.  
(2) Hausman test  
The random effects model can be consistently estimated by both the RE estimator or the FE 
estimator. We would prefer the RE estimator if we can be sure that the individual-specific effect 
really is an unrelated effect. This is usually tested by a (Durbin-Wu-) Hausmann test. 
 An initial difference between two specific-effects models is whether the unobserved 
individual effects 𝛼& is correlated with the 𝑋&'. In order to testing this assumption, Hausman 
(1978) proposed a test based on such difference. When 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼&, 𝑋&') ≠ 0, 𝛽klm is consistent, 
while 	𝛽knm is inconsistent. 
Hence, the Hausman test statistic is given by 
𝑤 = 𝑞q[𝑣𝑎𝑟s𝛽klmt − 𝑣𝑎𝑟s𝛽knmt]`9𝑞	~	𝜒?,                (3.22) 
with 𝑞 = 𝛽klm − 𝛽knm, 𝛽klm denotes the fixed effects estimated value of the parameter 𝛽, and 
same as the 𝛽knm . The statistic 𝑤  is distributed 𝜒?under the null of RE, with degrees of 
freedom determined by the dimension of 𝛽, 𝑘. 
And the null and alternative hypothesis is defined as:  
𝐻H:	𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼&, 𝑋&') = 0, 
𝐻9: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝛼&, 𝑋&') ≠ 0, 
If the value of 𝑤 is close to 0, it indicates that null hypothesis is true. Then we conclude the 
random effects should be used. If we get a large value of 𝑤, we are going to reject the null 
hypothesis, which means fixed effects is the optimal choice. 
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However, the Hausman test is only valid under homoscedasticity and cannot include time 
fixed effects. Mundlak (1978) considered a one-way error component model with the additional 
auxiliary regression, but we won’t go deeper here. 
3.2 Model construction  
3.2.1 Financial modelling  
In Chapter 2, we introduced the theoretical basis of corporate capital structure choice and 
discussed the hypotheses of its influence factors. Combining all the information provided 
previously with the methodology from this chapter, we build a single-equation static panel data 
model for latter practical analysis. The model is aimed to help studying the impact of 
macroeconomic variables on corporate capital structure, by setting microeconomic factors as 
control variable. It shows as: 
𝐿𝐸𝑉&' = 𝑋&'𝛼 + 𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜&'𝛽 + 𝑢&',               (3.23) 
in which 𝐿𝐸𝑉&'  represent the leverage ratio of firm 𝑖  at time 𝑡 . 𝑋&'  stands for 
macroeconomic variables which have effects on companies’ capital structure, such as business 
cycle, interest rate, inflation rate, default risk, etc. 𝑀𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜&' stands for firm-specific variables, 
for example, a firm’s size, profitability, liquidity, risk level, and so on. 
3.2.2 Variables 
(1) Dependent variables 
We measure a company’s leverage (LEV) by total debt ratio, which compares a company’s 
total liability to its total assets. 
(2) Macroeconomic factors 
In accordance to Mokhova and Zinecker (2014), which study provides extensive literature 
research on macroeconomic factors and capital structure, we decide to use the real gross 
domestic product (GDP) year-on-year growth rate (GR_GDP) and long-term interest rate 
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(LTIR) as independent variables. They both are commonly used and can represent prevailing 
business cycle stage in the economy. 
(3) Microeconomic factors 
Our model also takes firm-specific microeconomic factors into consideration as control 
variables. 
Size (SIZE) is measured by the natural logarithm of a company’s total assets. The company 
with lager size is considered to have less possibility to go bankruptcy, thus has higher leverage. 
  Profitability, measured by return on assets, plays a key role in company’s decision making 
on capital structure. It is computed as total liabilities over total assets in our model. 
  The definition of the above variables is shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Definition of variables. 
Variables Name Symbol Measurement 
Dependent variables Leverage LEV Total liabilities over total assets 
Independent variables GDP GR_GDP Year-on-year growth rate  
Rate LTIR Long-term interest rate 
Control variables Size SIZE Natural logarithm of total assets  
Profitability ROA Return on assets 
3.3 Sample description 
Our sample consists of quarterly data of 14 companies in gaming industry and 12 companies 
in automotive industry during the period 2007-2017. All companies observed are listed in the 
United States’ major stock markets. The firm-specific microeconomic data is collected, 
organized and published by Bloomberg. And the source of macroeconomic data is Federal 
Reserve Economic Data (FRED). 
In this thesis, we chose companies published before FQ1 2007 and operated healthily during 





Table 3.2: Sample descriptive statistics: leverage ratio of gaming industry. 
T N MEAN MIN MAX STDEV 
FQ1 2007 14 0.569 0.115 1.143 0.296 
FQ2 2007 14 0.587 0.097 1.169 0.294 
FQ3 2007 14 0.592 0.143 1.193 0.290 
FQ4 2007 14 0.619 0.136 1.518 0.348 
FQ1 2008 14 0.623 0.134 1.639 0.380 
FQ2 2008 14 0.622 0.140 1.571 0.368 
FQ3 2008 14 0.596 0.173 1.576 0.378 
FQ4 2008 14 0.594 0.173 1.659 0.385 
FQ1 2009 14 0.601 0.154 1.749 0.404 
FQ2 2009 14 0.604 0.157 1.780 0.400 
FQ3 2009 14 0.576 0.179 1.534 0.359 
FQ4 2009 14 0.498 0.128 0.828 0.255 
FQ1 2010 14 0.497 0.086 0.834 0.246 
FQ2 2010 14 0.495 0.057 0.857 0.259 
FQ3 2010 14 0.491 0.062 0.867 0.263 
FQ4 2010 14 0.507 0.065 0.870 0.270 
FQ1 2011 14 0.527 0.070 0.872 0.239 
FQ2 2011 14 0.488 0.112 0.770 0.190 
FQ3 2011 14 0.480 0.057 0.790 0.207 
FQ4 2011 14 0.485 0.060 0.786 0.213 
FQ1 2012 14 0.487 0.058 0.940 0.247 
FQ2 2012 14 0.486 0.055 0.920 0.250 
FQ3 2012 14 0.482 0.063 0.910 0.259 
FQ4 2012 14 0.546 0.063 0.986 0.261 
FQ1 2013 14 0.538 0.072 0.964 0.263 
FQ2 2013 14 0.564 0.146 0.977 0.266 
FQ3 2013 14 0.553 0.120 0.970 0.269 
FQ4 2013 14 0.585 0.103 1.250 0.335 
FQ1 2014 14 0.597 0.103 1.361 0.351 
FQ2 2014 14 0.600 0.107 1.206 0.312 
FQ3 2014 14 0.617 0.118 1.337 0.334 
FQ4 2014 14 0.661 0.118 1.429 0.385 
FQ1 2015 14 0.582 0.120 1.020 0.282 
FQ2 2015 14 0.591 0.112 1.027 0.275 
FQ3 2015 14 0.648 0.230 1.132 0.305 
FQ4 2015 14 0.663 0.270 1.193 0.328 
FQ1 2016 14 0.600 0.113 1.206 0.342 
FQ2 2016 14 0.620 0.149 1.223 0.335 
FQ3 2016 14 0.619 0.163 1.237 0.327 
FQ4 2016 14 0.618 0.177 1.273 0.331 
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Table 3.2 (continued) 
T N MEAN MIN MAX STDEV 
FQ1 2017 14 0.653 0.284 1.282 0.305 
FQ2 2017 14 0.659 0.287 1.283 0.300 
FQ3 2017 14 0.639 0.260 1.280 0.296 
FQ4 2017 14 0.651 0.253 1.262 0.296 
Source: Bloomberg 
Table 3.2 collects sample mean (MEAN), minimum value (MIN), maximum value (MAX) 
and standard deviation (STDEV) of all samples (N) at each quarter (T).  
According to the data above, the maximum values in each quarter are quite high, most of 
which are even higher than 1. However, the minimum values are extremely low. The huge gap 
between the minimum and maximum values indicates large differences on capital structures 
among companies in this industry. High level of standard deviation also reveals such situation. 
Mean leverage ratio fluctuates within the range of 0.48-0.70, which is at a relatively high level. 
Table 3.3: Sample descriptive statistics: leverage ratio of automotive industry. 
T N MEAN MAX MIN STDEV 
FQ1 2007 12 0.724 1.012 0.479 0.138 
FQ2 2007 12 0.721 1.005 0.481 0.137 
FQ3 2007 12 0.712 0.996 0.525 0.127 
FQ4 2007 12 0.715 0.982 0.580 0.116 
FQ1 2008 12 0.712 0.978 0.585 0.114 
FQ2 2008 12 0.715 1.012 0.604 0.120 
FQ3 2008 12 0.719 1.018 0.602 0.120 
FQ4 2008 12 0.735 1.077 0.614 0.129 
FQ1 2009 12 0.739 1.079 0.614 0.130 
FQ2 2009 12 0.735 1.046 0.600 0.124 
FQ3 2009 12 0.740 1.035 0.615 0.118 
FQ4 2009 12 0.754 1.040 0.635 0.110 
FQ1 2010 12 0.756 1.028 0.638 0.109 
FQ2 2010 12 0.754 1.019 0.627 0.111 
FQ3 2010 12 0.744 1.010 0.625 0.108 
FQ4 2010 12 0.731 1.004 0.542 0.115 
FQ1 2011 12 0.724 0.985 0.541 0.113 
FQ2 2011 12 0.716 0.968 0.534 0.111 
FQ3 2011 12 0.713 0.963 0.516 0.115 
FQ4 2011 12 0.714 0.916 0.502 0.107 
FQ1 2012 12 0.710 0.909 0.497 0.108 
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Table 3.3 (continued) 
T N MEAN MAX MIN STDEV 
FQ2 2012 12 0.715 0.906 0.517 0.106 
FQ3 2012 12 0.718 0.897 0.523 0.103 
FQ4 2012 12 0.715 0.915 0.517 0.101 
FQ1 2013 12 0.711 0.908 0.516 0.100 
FQ2 2013 12 0.706 0.901 0.508 0.100 
FQ3 2013 12 0.702 0.897 0.498 0.099 
FQ4 2013 12 0.691 0.870 0.478 0.097 
FQ1 2014 12 0.685 0.870 0.470 0.100 
FQ2 2014 12 0.682 0.873 0.477 0.100 
FQ3 2014 12 0.682 0.874 0.471 0.103 
FQ4 2014 12 0.682 0.882 0.480 0.102 
FQ1 2015 12 0.681 0.883 0.464 0.113 
FQ2 2015 12 0.673 0.879 0.465 0.110 
FQ3 2015 12 0.672 0.876 0.453 0.116 
FQ4 2015 12 0.677 0.872 0.477 0.119 
FQ1 2016 12 0.669 0.877 0.453 0.130 
FQ2 2016 12 0.670 0.870 0.495 0.126 
FQ3 2016 12 0.669 0.866 0.472 0.125 
FQ4 2016 12 0.673 0.877 0.479 0.123 
Source: Bloomberg 
Seen from above, the values of standard deviation are around 0.1, indicating that the 
difference of leverage ratio is rather small among companies in the automotive industry. In each 
quarter, the maximum value of leverage is higher than 0.8 and the mean value is approximate 
to 0.7, showing that the automotive companies listed in the U.S. market generally have a high 











Chart 3.1: Mean leverage ratio of gaming and automotive industries. 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Chart 3.1 illustrates how the mean leverage ratios of both gaming and automotive industries 
have changed over the period from FQ1 2007 to FQ4 2017. For the gaming industry, the chart 
shows an overall increasing trend with little fluctuations. To be specific, the mean leverage ratio 
reached the trough in 2012, and gradually rose from 2012 to 2017. The blue curve demonstrates 
the mean leverage of the automotive industry slightly increased from 2008 to 2010, and after 
culminating in 2010 then gradually declined till 2017. 
From a general perspective, the automotive industry had a higher leverage level than the 
gaming industry did in the period. However, during recent years the two curves were 
converging, reflecting the fact that the difference between two industries’ mean leverages tends 
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4 Results and discussion 
In this chapter, we apply the sample data into panel data methods described in Chapter 3, and 
then discuss about the resulting information.  
As our thesis is focused on two targeting industries: the gaming industry and the automotive 
industry, we will set up one model for each industry separately and compare them with each 
other in the section of discussing. 
For building and optimizing an econometrics model to figure out how macroeconomic 
factors affect corporate leverage in the U.S. specific industries, we need to follow a series of 
process. 
First of all, we summarize the data and check if the panel is balanced. Secondly, we use the 
correlation command to display the covariance matrix for all variables. By doing so, we can 
examine whether the effect of autocorrelations is critical or not. After that, three methods will 
be operated respectively to build three different models. In the end, a Hausman test will tell us 




4.1 Gaming industry 
4.1.1 Data summary 
Table 4.1: Summary of data from gaming industry 
 
Table 4.1 shows our data set contains in total 14 observed firms and 44 time periods. The 
overall mean of leverage ratio is 0.58, which is very close to the result we got in chart 3.1. The 
average GDP year-on-year growth rate is 1.74, indicating the GDP is almost twice as much as 
which from the same fiscal quarter of the previous year. The value of average ROA is negative 
in this industry, shows a general characteristic of low profitability of American listed gaming 
companies during 2007-2017. 
4.1.2 The unit root test 
We implement Levin–Lin–Chu (2002) test for unit root or stationarity in panel dataset within 




         within                 .397859   5.722192   9.013001       T =      44
         between               2.422823    3.66514   10.12117       n =      14
SIZE     overall    6.723563   2.370218   3.457962   10.28055       N =     616
                                                               
         within                .0454698  -.4259581   .3855933       T =      44
         between               .0215777  -.0701098   .0150388       n =      14
ROA      overall   -.0019966   .0500055  -.4940712   .3866837       N =     616
                                                               
         within                 .867698   1.563333   4.846667       T =      44
         between                      0   2.777652   2.777652       n =      14
X2LTIR   overall    2.777652    .867698   1.563333   4.846667       N =     616
                                                               
         within                8.812245  -13.80772   10.22775       T =      40
         between                      0    1.74457    1.74457       n =      14
GR_X1GDP overall     1.74457   8.812245  -13.80772   10.22775       N =     560
                                                               
         within                .1824632  -.2331753   1.433788       T =      44
         between               .2488494   .2277483   .9210597       n =      14
LEV      overall    .5752623   .3014781   .0547424   1.779586       N =     616
                                                                               
Variable                Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max      Observations
. xtsum LEV GR_X1GDP X2LTIR ROA SIZE
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Table 4.2: Unit root test for LEV 
 
Table 4.3: Unit root test for GR_GDP 
 
  
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*        -11.7673        0.0000
 Unadjusted t       -15.6850
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 11.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     44
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     14
                                    
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for LEV
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*         -9.5300        0.0000
 Unadjusted t       -12.4572
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 11.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     40
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     14
                                         
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for GR_X1GDP
. xtunitroot llc GR_X1GDP, lag(1)
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Table 4.4: Unit root test for LTIR 
 
Table 4.5: Unit root test for ROA 
 
  
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*        -12.3535        0.0000
 Unadjusted t       -17.1426
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 11.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     44
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     14
                                       
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for X3LTIR
. xtunitroot llc X3LTIR, lag(1)
. 
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*         -7.6548        0.0000
 Unadjusted t       -14.3231
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 11.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     44
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     14
                                    
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for ROA
. xtunitroot llc ROA, lag(1)
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Table 4.6: Unit root test for SIZE 
 
Table 4.7: Summary of unit root test results 
variables Adjusted t* p-value Results 
LEV -11.7673 0.0000 Stationary 
GR_GDP -9.5300 0.0000 Stationary 
LTIR -12.3535 0.0000 Stationary 
ROA -7.6548 0.0000 Stationary 
SIZE -9.0179 0.0000 Stationary 
  Table 4.2-Table 4.6 are outcomes of applying Levin-Lin-Chu to each subset of data, to 
examine whether they contain unit roots. Basic specification information is provided in the 
header of each table. As we use the gaming industry of the United States as the study object 
with time duration of 11 years quarterly, so each subset of data contains 14 panels and 44 time 
periods. The null and alternative hypotheses are also presented.  
Table 4.7 collects all the results from unit root tests above. As we can see, all of the Levin-
Lin-Chu bias-adjusted t statistics (Adjusted t*) are significantly less than zero, and p-values are 
equal to zero. Therefore, we reject 𝐻H of a unit root and accept 𝐻9, indicating that all panels 
are stationary. 
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*         -9.0179        0.0000
 Unadjusted t       -14.2021
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 11.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     44
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     14
                                     
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for SIZE
. xtunitroot llc SIZE, lag(1)
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4.1.3 Correlation analysis 
Before making further estimations, we first test the model’s correlativity among variables by 
using pairwise correlation function. 
Table 4.8: Correlation matrix 
  
Table 4.8 displays all pairwise correlation coefficients. According to the research of Judge et 
el. (1998), if the absolute value of correlation coefficient is lower than 0.8, then the 
multicollinearity is low and won’t cause much harm. It can be seen that most of absolute values 
of correlation coefficients in the output are lower than 0.5, which is considered as a moderate 
correlation level, so we can conclude there is no serious multicollinearity and multiple 
regression can be performed.  
4.1.4 Results of regression modelling 
In this subsection, we run Pooled OLS, fixed effects estimation and random effects 
estimation respectively, and then use Hausman test to decide which one is more appropriate.  
Table 4.9: Pooled OLS regression 
        SIZE     0.4959   0.0609  -0.0528   0.1108   1.0000 
         ROA    -0.2392   0.0469  -0.0258   1.0000 
      X2LTIR    -0.0024  -0.7107   1.0000 
    GR_X1GDP     0.0740   1.0000 
         LEV     1.0000 
                                                           
                    LEV GR_X1GDP   X2LTIR      ROA     SIZE




  Table 4.9 shows the result of Pooled OLS regression analysis, which provides us several 
pieces of important information. This method is simply a way that sorting out which of those 
variables has an impact and specifying how high the impact is. In this case, the 𝑅? value (R-
squared) is 0.3628, representing that 36.28% of variability of dependent variable can be 
explained by independent variables. Then, we can check the F test, in other words, statistical 
significance (Pro > F) of the regression model. Because the p value of F test is 0.0000, our 
model applied is proved to be statistically significant. As we are going to find out the 
relationship between dependent and independent variables, we need to focus on the coefficients 
(Coef.) for variables and the results of T test. The table shows that GDP growth rate 
(GR_X1GDP) and firm size (SIZE) are significantly positively correlated with leverage (LEV) 
at the 1% significance level, long-term interest rate (LTIR) is significantly positively correlated 
with leverage (LEV) at the 5% significance level, and return on assets (ROA) is significantly 







                                                                              
       _cons    -.0136205   .0576987    -0.24   0.813     -.126955     .099714
        SIZE     .0686258   .0042904    16.00   0.000     .0601985    .0770532
         ROA    -1.707468   .1961051    -8.71   0.000    -2.092667   -1.322269
      X2LTIR     .0427633   .0173459     2.47   0.014     .0086916     .076835
    GR_X1GDP     .0047114   .0016338     2.88   0.004     .0015022    .0079207
                                                                              
         LEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total    49.8429138       559  .089164425   Root MSE        =    .23921
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.3582
    Residual    31.7579613       555  .057221552   R-squared       =    0.3628
       Model    18.0849525         4  4.52123813   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 555)       =     79.01
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       560
. reg LEV GR_X1GDP X2LTIR ROA SIZE
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Table 4.10: Fixed effects model 
  
The value of Prob > F equals to 0, shows our model is okay. It is a F test to see whether all 
the coefficients in the model are different than 0. When the result is smaller than 0.05, it means 
coefficients are different than 0, and the whole model is statistically significant.  
In the model presented in table 4.10, GDP growth rate (GR_X1GDP), the long-term interest 
rate (LTIR) and firm size (SIZE) are significantly positively correlated with leverage (LEV) at 
the 1% significance level, return on assets (ROA) is significantly negatively correlated with 
leverage (LEV) at the 1% significance level. 








. est store fixed
F test that all u_i=0: F(13, 542) = 40.09                    Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .53003482   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .17283681
     sigma_u    .18355051
                                                                              
       _cons    -.1084297   .1402257    -0.77   0.440    -.3838821    .1670227
        SIZE     .0829556   .0198626     4.18   0.000     .0439384    .1219728
         ROA    -.8407724   .1566034    -5.37   0.000    -1.148396   -.5331484
      X2LTIR     .0430283   .0125555     3.43   0.001     .0183649    .0676917
    GR_X1GDP     .0042542   .0012101     3.52   0.000     .0018772    .0066313
                                                                              
         LEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.1552                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(4,542)          =      14.82
     overall = 0.3321                                         max =         40
     between = 0.4649                                         avg =       40.0
     within  = 0.0986                                         min =         40
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: company                         Number of groups  =         14
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        560
. xtreg LEV GR_X1GDP X2LTIR ROA SIZE,fe
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Table 4.10: Random effects model 
 
Identically with the fixed effects model, the GDP growth rate (GR_X1GDP), long-term 
interest rate (LTIR) and firm size (SIZE) are significantly positively correlated with leverage 
(LEV) at the 1% significance level, return on assets (ROA) is significantly negatively correlated 
with leverage (LEV) at the 1% significance level. 
4.1.5 The Hausman test 
We eventually implement the Hausman specification test, which compares the fixed-effects 
model with the random-effects model. To do that, we have stored the results from random 
effects model and fixed effects model in the previous section to make those results current, and 
then perform the test.  
  
. est store random
                                                                              
         rho    .41379593   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .17283681
     sigma_u    .14521281
                                                                              
       _cons    -.0447139   .1031779    -0.43   0.665    -.2469388     .157511
        SIZE      .073601   .0129553     5.68   0.000     .0482091    .0989929
         ROA    -.8659008   .1560197    -5.55   0.000    -1.171694   -.5601079
      X2LTIR     .0426816    .012615     3.38   0.001     .0179566    .0674067
    GR_X1GDP     .0043916   .0011996     3.66   0.000     .0020404    .0067428
                                                                              
         LEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(4)      =      75.42
     overall = 0.3390                                         max =         40
     between = 0.4747                                         avg =       40.0
     within  = 0.0981                                         min =         40
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: company                         Number of groups  =         14
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        560
. xtreg LEV GR_X1GDP X2LTIR ROA SIZE,re
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Table 4.11 The Hausman test  
 
  The null hypothesis here is that difference in coefficients not systematic and the individual-
level effects are adequately modeled by a random effects model. Due to the p value of Chi-
squared test (Prob > chi2) is 0.0152, we do not reject the null hypothesis, and keep the random 
effects model as the optimal result. 
4.2 Automotive industry 
Similar to the previous section, we apply automotive industry data into the modelling process 
in this part. 
4.2.1  Data summary 
Table 4.13: Summary of data from automotive industry 
 
  
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0152
                          =        8.37
                  chi2(2) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
        SIZE      .0829556      .073601        .0093546         .015208
         ROA     -.8407724    -.8659008        .0251284        .0216436
      X2LTIR      .0430283     .0426816        .0003467        .0005823
    GR_X1GDP      .0042542     .0043916       -.0001373        .0002059
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     




Table 4.13 (continued) 
 
The dataset is a strongly balanced panel because in which each panel member is observed 
every year, therefore the number of observations N equals to panel members 𝑛 multiply by 
time period 𝑇. 
Table 4.13 shows overall mean leverage is 0.7054, verified the conclusion we described in 
Chapter 2.3 that the overall leverage of automotive industry is high. The panels of 
macroeconomic variables are the same with which in Table 4.1, so we won’t describe it again 
here. The value of average return on assets is still quite low, however, compared with the 
negative ROA in gaming industry, automotive industry displays a much better profitability. 
What’s more, average size in gaming industry is around 6 and in automotive industry is 11, 
shows that the latter industry owns firms with larger scale. 
  
. xtset Company
         within                 .178137   10.57502   11.65141       T =      44
         between               1.376877   9.101511   12.77143       n =      12
SIZE     overall    11.16517    1.33148   8.511368   13.13737       N =     528
                                                               
         within                .0126224  -.0902033   .0782936       T =      44
         between               .0042535    .001701   .0173901       n =      12
ROA      overall    .0080313   .0132642  -.0965336   .0759562       N =     528
                                                               
         within                .8678156   1.563333   4.846667       T =      44
         between                      0   2.777652   2.777652       n =      12
X2LTIR   overall    2.777652   .8678156   1.563333   4.846667       N =     528
                                                               
         within                8.813559  -13.80772   10.22775       T =      40
         between               2.32e-16    1.74457    1.74457       n =      12
GR_X1GDP overall     1.74457   8.813559  -13.80772   10.22775       N =     480
                                                               
         within                .0565636   .4651703   .8451129       T =      44
         between               .1021781   .5495921   .9397396       n =      12
LEV      overall    .7053572   .1130837   .4532289   1.079495       N =     528
                                                                               
Variable                Mean   Std. Dev.       Min        Max      Observations
. xtsum LEV GR_X1GDP X2LTIR ROA SIZE
44 
 
4.2.2 The unit root test 
Table 4.14: Unit root test for LEV 
 
Table 4.15: Unit root test for ROA 
 
  
. xtunitroot llc ROA,lag(1)
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*         -9.0301        0.0000
 Unadjusted t       -13.5387
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 11.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     44
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     12
                                    
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for LEV
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*         -9.9206        0.0000
 Unadjusted t       -14.3646
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 11.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     44
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     12
                                    
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for ROA
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Table 4.16: Unit root test for SIZE 
 
Table 4.17: Summary of unit root test results 
variables Adjusted t* p-value Results 
LEV -9.0301 0.0000 Stationary 
GR_GDP -9.5300 0.0000 Stationary 
LTIR -12.3535 0.0000 Stationary 
ROA -9.9206 0.0000 Stationary 
SIZE -8.3289 0.0000 Stationary 
Table 4.17 reports the outputs from all of the unit root tests above. We get the perfect results 
that each bias adjusted t is smaller than 0 and p-value is equal to 0, so we reject the null 
hypothesis, concluding that each one of the member panel is stationary. 
4.2.3 Correlation analysis 
Table 4.18: Correlation matrix 
 
Table 4.18 is simply a table showing correlation coefficients among macroeconomic 
                                                                              
 Adjusted t*         -8.3289        0.0000
 Unadjusted t       -13.4148
                                                                              
                    Statistic      p-value
                                                                              
LR variance:     Bartlett kernel, 11.00 lags average (chosen by LLC)
ADF regressions: 1 lag
Time trend:   Not included
Panel means:  Included
AR parameter: Common                        Asymptotics: N/T -> 0
Ha: Panels are stationary                   Number of periods =     44
Ho: Panels contain unit roots               Number of panels  =     12
                                     
Levin-Lin-Chu unit-root test for SIZE
        SIZE     0.2683   0.0236  -0.0824  -0.0856   1.0000 
         ROA    -0.2314   0.1572  -0.1109   1.0000 
      X2LTIR     0.1297   0.1070   1.0000 
 L2.GR_X1GDP    -0.1496   1.0000 
         LEV     1.0000 
                                                           
                    LEV L2.GR_~P   X2LTIR      ROA     SIZE
. pwcorr LEV L2.GR_X1GDP X2LTIR ROA SIZE
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variables and firm-specific variables in automotive industry. We can see that the pair of LEV 
and SIZE has the highest correlation of -0.2683. ROA overall has high correlations with other 
variables, the absolute value of each of them is higher than 0.1. On the whole, all of the 
correlation coefficients are smaller than 0.5, thus the impact of multicollinearity is considered 
to be too small that can be ignored. 
4.2.4 Results of regression modelling 
In this subsection, the methods of Pooled OLS, fixed effects and random effects will be 
applied in sequence as what we did in Chapter 4.14. As a result, we will get three different 
models, but only one of them will be kept as the optimal result. 
Table 4.19: Pooled OLS regression 
 
In the output above, the  𝑅? value of 0.1494 is quite low, indicating the model explains 
only little of the variability. In accordance with what we introduced in the methodology part, 
all individually specific effects are completely ignore by this method, hence the fixed effects 
model and random effects model are more ideal in this case. 
  
                                                                              
       _cons     .3972708   .0464934     8.54   0.000     .3059002    .4886415
        SIZE     .0235369    .003698     6.36   0.000     .0162694    .0308044
         ROA    -1.179406   .3657229    -3.22   0.001    -1.898139   -.4606736
      X2LTIR     .0200604   .0059518     3.37   0.001     .0083636    .0317571
              
         L2.    -.0018959   .0005628    -3.37   0.001     -.003002   -.0007898
    GR_X1GDP  
                                                                              
         LEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
       Total     5.7421089       455   .01262002   Root MSE        =    .10407
                                                   Adj R-squared   =    0.1419
    Residual     4.8842235       451  .010829764   R-squared       =    0.1494
       Model      .8578854         4   .21447135   Prob > F        =    0.0000
                                                   F(4, 451)       =     19.80
      Source         SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       456
. reg LEV L2.GR_X1GDP X2LTIR ROA SIZE
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Table 4.20: Fixed effects model 
 
Table 4.21: Random effects model 
 
In models presented in Table 4.20 and Table 4.21, all variables have the expected p-value, 
F test that all u_i=0: F(11, 440) = 146.95                   Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .88164896   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .04873458
     sigma_u    .13301451
                                                                              
       _cons    -.3750202   .2064387    -1.82   0.070    -.7807486    .0307082
        SIZE     .0902961   .0178855     5.05   0.000     .0551445    .1254476
         ROA    -.9834551   .1784826    -5.51   0.000    -1.334239   -.6326708
      X2LTIR     .0291986   .0036402     8.02   0.000     .0220443    .0363529
              
         L2.    -.0022722   .0002781    -8.17   0.000    -.0028189   -.0017256
    GR_X1GDP  
                                                                              
         LEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.6748                        Prob > F          =     0.0000
                                                F(4,440)          =      40.42
     overall = 0.1166                                         max =         38
     between = 0.1112                                         avg =       38.0
     within  = 0.2687                                         min =         38
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: Company                         Number of groups  =         12
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs     =        456
. xtreg LEV L2.GR_X1GDP X2LTIR ROA SIZE,fe
                                                                              
         rho    .82211597   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .04873458
     sigma_u     .1047696
                                                                              
       _cons     -.082657   .1663948    -0.50   0.619    -.4087848    .2434707
        SIZE     .0649448   .0141665     4.58   0.000      .037179    .0927105
         ROA    -.9907795    .179091    -5.53   0.000    -1.341791   -.6397677
      X2LTIR     .0258656   .0033543     7.71   0.000     .0192912      .03244
              
         L2.     -.002147   .0002738    -7.84   0.000    -.0026837   -.0016103
    GR_X1GDP  
                                                                              
         LEV        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                              
corr(u_i, X)   = 0 (assumed)                    Prob > chi2       =     0.0000
                                                Wald chi2(4)      =     156.39
     overall = 0.1258                                         max =         38
     between = 0.1121                                         avg =       38.0
     within  = 0.2657                                         min =         38
R-sq:                                           Obs per group:
Group variable: Company                         Number of groups  =         12
Random-effects GLS regression                   Number of obs     =        456
. xtreg LEV L2.GR_X1GDP X2LTIR ROA SIZE,re
48 
 
meaning their correlation with LEV are significant.  
4.2.5 The Hausman test 
Table 4.22: The Hausman test  
 
Now it comes to the problem that, which model is more ideal? Is it FE or RE? So, we run the 
Hausman test to find out. As the table presents, p value of Chi-squared test (Prob > chi2) is 0.25, 
which obviously doesn’t equal to 0, so we accept the null hypothesis, and keep the random 
effects model as the optimal result. 
4.3 Discussion  
The third part of the chapter is about the empirical findings and discussion of this study. 
Table 4.23: Regression results 
 Gaming Industry LEV Automotive Industry LEV 
GR_GDP 0.0439*** 
(0.000) 







                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.2500
                          =        5.39
                  chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
        SIZE      .0902961     .0649448        .0253513        .0109179
         ROA     -.9834551    -.9907795        .0073244               .
      X2LTIR      .0291986     .0258656         .003333         .001414
         L2.     -.0022722     -.002147       -.0001252        .0000487
    GR_X1GDP  
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
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Table 4.23 (continued) 









FE/RE Random Effect Random Effect 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. Value in the bracket: p-value. 
According to the empirical study output presented by Table 4.23, we specifically analyze the 
impact of each variable as follows: 
In the U.S. gaming industry, at 1% significance level, there is a significant positive 
correlation between the GDP growth rate and listed firms’ leverage ratios. It shows that after 
controlling other firm-specific factors, the capital structure reveals a procyclical change. That 
is, during the expansion phase, with the rises of GDP, the companies’ debt ratio increases 
correspondingly. This finding supports the hypothesis of the trade-off theory. 
As for the automotive industry, the variable of GDP growth rate has a negative sign with a 
lag for two quarters. It appears that during the expansion phase, the capital structure shows a 
countercyclical change in response to GDP change. This corresponds with the expected 
conclusions of the pecking order theory, because in the macroeconomic expansion phase, the 
increase in corporate profits and the increase in net cash flow can bring more endogenous funds 
to the company to support new projects or repay debts in advance. Therefore, companies will 
tend to have low target debt ratios, driving companies to issue more shares or fewer bonds to 
reduce financial leverage. When the macroeconomy declines, the company's net cash flow is 
reduced, thus it can do nothing but financing from debt, resulting in an increase in financial 
leverage. The lag shows the response of a company’s leverage to GDP change will be delayed 
for two quarters. 
Our results show that there are differences between companies when making decisions on 
capital structure in respond to the GDP growth. Two industries display totally opposite choices 
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when facing with macroeconomic change. Both of them can be supported by different theories. 
This might be caused by the differences among industries. The differences could be in the 
financing preference, financing constraints, or some other possible factors, which need to be 
examined further.  
The regression results show that in both two industries, long-term interest rates are 
significantly positively correlated with the leverage ratio of listed companies, which gives proof 
of hypothesis 2 in Chapter 2.5.2. Usually when the interest rate increases, the increase in debt 
interest will increase the debt financing cost of the company. At this time, a company normally 
will choose to reduce the debt ratio to ensure that the average capital cost of the company does 
not rise. However, in the models presented in Table 4.23, it shows an exactly opposite 
relationship to this. It is because the data we use is U.S. T-bonds rate. The boom in the bond 
market will directly lead to a downturn in stock market. Therefore, listed companies cannot get 
sufficient funds from stock market, as a result, companies will increase their leverage. 
Same for gaming and automotive industries, the return on assets rate is negatively correlated 
with the leverage ratio of listed companies at the 1% significance level, which is also in 
consistent with the expectation based on the pecking order theory. Because companies with 
strong profitability usually accordingly have strong ability of inner financing, so companies 
with strong profitability will tend to reduce the debt ratio. 
In line with Table 4.23, a company’s size has significant positive correlation with its leverage 
ratio at 1% significance level. The result confirms our hypothesis, concluding that larger firms 
have higher risk tolerance, hence prefer higher leverage. 





This thesis is aimed to explore how business cycle would affect the corporate capital structure 
choice by conducting an investigation of the relationship between leverage and macroeconomic 
factors. Since macroeconomic conditions have been proved to be important factors that 
influence corporates’ financing choices (e.g. Choe et al.,1993; Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Cook 
and Tang, 2010; Xin et al., 2018), this study lays the emphasis on two industries in the United 
States which are considered to be greatly influenced by the macroeconomy – the gaming 
industry and the automotive industry. We investigate determinants of listed companies’ (get rid 
of companies with insufficient information) leverage in these two industries with the help of 
panel data model.  
Main content of our thesis can be divided roughly into two major parts, a theoretical one and 
an empirical one. Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 are contained in theoretical part, and Chapter 4 is 
the empirical part. 
In Chapter 2, we firstly introduce the Modigliani-Miller theorem, the trade-off theory and the 
pecking order theory, providing the theoretical basis for the whole thesis. In the second section, 
we describe the general situations of both gaming industry and automotive industry in the 
United States in detail. Next, we describe the current situation of the targeting market. And then, 
we refer some prior empirical researches and find out that such industries are highly sensitive 
to the macroeconomic cycle. Last but not least, we lay our hypotheses in Chapter 2.5 based on 
the aforementioned theories. 
It gives a comprehensive theoretical guidance on the selection and construction of the panel 
data model in Chapter 3, preparing for the empirical analysis. The theorem of panel data model, 
and three different estimation methods, as well as several tests are introduced in Chapter 3.1. 
We set up a model in Chapter 3.2, after that, explain the meaning and measurement approach 
for each variable in detail. Chapter 3.3 is about the description of sample data. We collect data 
for the period FQ1 2007-FQ4 2017. By analyzing the dataset, we find that the both industries 
have high leverage. The automotive industry has even higher leverage level than gaming 
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industry. However, during recent years the difference between two industries’ mean leverages 
tends to diminish to a minimal level.   
In Chapter 4, we develop panel data model for each industry, where leverage is treated as the 
dependent variable. According to the result of Hausman test, we employ the random effects 
estimator to examine the relationship between the corporate capital structure choice and 
macroeconomic variable. Our finding that both long-term interest rate and size have 
significantly positive correlation with leverage ratio and return on assets has obviously negative 
correlation with leverage ratio is consistent with hypotheses.  
The companies’ leverage in gaming and automotive industries have totally different reactions 
regarding to the change of GDP. For companies in the gaming industry, when GDP growth rate 
increases, the leverage will increase accordingly. This result can support the trade-off theory 
which holds that when GDP growth accelerate, the macroeconomy is in a boom, an American 
gaming company will have stronger profitability and lower risk, it can bear higher interest costs 
than before and benefit more from tax shield, therefore, it will choose to have higher leverage. 
By contrast, as for automotive industry, the leverage is negatively correlate with GDP growth 
rate. That is to say, when the GDP growth slows down, an automotive company gains higher 
profit can get sufficient funds internally, so it will decide to cut down the leverage ratio in two 
quarters. 
We purpose some conjectures and hypotheses about the reasons that might cause such 
difference. The first one is, some industry-specific factors may exist that influence the financing 
preference of the whole industry. The second one is, unlike the gaming industry, since 
automotive companies that listed in American stock markets are mostly the international 
companies, their financing behavior should also be influenced by the international 
macroeconomic environment, therefore some bias may be generated. Future research could be 
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Annex 1: Companies’ leverage ratios in the U.S. gaming industry 
t NG FH Cant. Dover GP Golden Empire Penn Scient. Boyd Melco WYNN MGM LVS 
FQ1 2007 0.75 0.42 0.20 0.53 0.33 0.12 1.14 0.79 0.69 0.69 0.14 0.64 0.83 0.71 
FQ2 2007 0.78 0.40 0.30 0.53 0.35 0.10 1.17 0.78 0.69 0.69 0.17 0.65 0.82 0.79 
FQ3 2007 0.79 0.35 0.20 0.55 0.33 0.14 1.19 0.78 0.69 0.69 0.34 0.63 0.81 0.80 
FQ4 2007 0.80 0.40 0.21 0.60 0.29 0.14 1.52 0.77 0.69 0.69 0.33 0.69 0.73 0.80 
FQ1 2008 0.77 0.30 0.21 0.58 0.29 0.13 1.64 0.77 0.68 0.71 0.31 0.72 0.78 0.82 
FQ2 2008 0.78 0.18 0.31 0.59 0.29 0.14 1.57 0.76 0.69 0.72 0.33 0.74 0.78 0.83 
FQ3 2008 0.38 0.19 0.18 0.59 0.26 0.17 1.58 0.74 0.69 0.72 0.41 0.81 0.78 0.85 
FQ4 2008 0.35 0.19 0.17 0.58 0.22 0.29 1.66 0.60 0.73 0.75 0.46 0.76 0.83 0.72 
FQ1 2009 0.34 0.15 0.18 0.55 0.26 0.28 1.75 0.59 0.75 0.75 0.49 0.75 0.83 0.72 
FQ2 2009 0.34 0.16 0.25 0.54 0.29 0.29 1.78 0.59 0.73 0.75 0.51 0.72 0.77 0.74 
FQ3 2009 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.55 0.26 0.29 1.53 0.58 0.71 0.75 0.49 0.72 0.80 0.76 
FQ4 2009 0.17 0.13 0.14 0.54 0.26 0.29 0.83 0.61 0.73 0.74 0.49 0.58 0.83 0.64 
FQ1 2010 0.25 0.09 0.19 0.51 0.22 0.31 0.83 0.59 0.73 0.72 0.48 0.56 0.82 0.63 
FQ2 2010 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.51 0.23 0.20 0.86 0.58 0.75 0.72 0.50 0.55 0.86 0.63 
FQ3 2010 0.27 0.06 0.20 0.51 0.19 0.21 0.84 0.57 0.74 0.74 0.50 0.55 0.87 0.61 
FQ4 2010 0.28 0.06 0.19 0.51 0.34 0.13 0.87 0.60 0.79 0.76 0.48 0.64 0.85 0.60 
FQ1 2011 0.38 0.41 0.21 0.48 0.33 0.07 0.87 0.58 0.78 0.75 0.48 0.61 0.84 0.58 
FQ2 2011 0.38 0.42 0.27 0.47 0.24 0.11 0.50 0.57 0.77 0.75 0.53 0.61 0.63 0.57 
FQ3 2011 0.39 0.44 0.21 0.48 0.22 0.06 0.49 0.56 0.79 0.75 0.52 0.61 0.64 0.56 
FQ4 2011 0.38 0.41 0.20 0.48 0.24 0.06 0.50 0.57 0.79 0.77 0.49 0.68 0.64 0.58 
FQ1 2012 0.39 0.26 0.23 0.45 0.21 0.06 0.50 0.56 0.78 0.76 0.48 0.94 0.65 0.55 
FQ2 2012 0.40 0.17 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.05 0.51 0.55 0.79 0.77 0.48 0.92 0.65 0.55 
FQ3 2012 0.40 0.13 0.25 0.45 0.19 0.06 0.49 0.56 0.82 0.78 0.48 0.91 0.67 0.55 
FQ4 2012 0.44 0.50 0.23 0.45 0.26 0.06 0.53 0.60 0.83 0.93 0.53 0.99 0.69 0.61 
FQ1 2013 0.45 0.49 0.24 0.42 0.19 0.07 0.54 0.58 0.85 0.92 0.51 0.96 0.70 0.60 
FQ2 2013 0.44 0.49 0.30 0.42 0.17 0.15 0.85 0.57 0.85 0.91 0.48 0.98 0.69 0.59 
FQ3 2013 0.43 0.49 0.26 0.42 0.17 0.12 0.86 0.56 0.84 0.88 0.47 0.97 0.69 0.59 
FQ4 2013 0.40 0.50 0.24 0.40 0.14 0.10 1.25 0.65 0.91 0.89 0.44 0.98 0.70 0.58 
FQ1 2014 0.42 0.50 0.25 0.37 0.15 0.10 1.36 0.65 0.93 0.89 0.46 0.96 0.69 0.61 
FQ2 2014 0.39 0.53 0.31 0.37 0.29 0.11 1.21 0.65 0.95 0.88 0.44 0.97 0.69 0.61 
FQ3 2014 0.37 0.54 0.26 0.37 0.33 0.12 1.34 0.68 0.97 0.90 0.51 0.97 0.69 0.60 
FQ4 2014 0.37 0.59 0.22 0.38 0.29 0.12 1.43 1.15 1.00 0.90 0.52 0.98 0.71 0.60 
FQ1 2015 0.37 0.60 0.25 0.36 0.29 0.12 0.66 0.75 1.02 0.89 0.51 1.02 0.71 0.58 
FQ2 2015 0.34 0.61 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.11 0.71 0.74 1.03 0.89 0.52 1.01 0.66 0.61 
FQ3 2015 0.31 0.61 0.23 0.35 0.34 0.47 0.86 1.13 1.11 0.89 0.52 1.01 0.65 0.59 
FQ4 2015 0.29 0.60 0.27 0.34 0.30 0.44 1.02 1.13 1.19 0.88 0.52 1.00 0.69 0.60 
2 
 
FQ1 2016 0.28 0.59 0.30 0.32 0.28 0.46 0.11 1.13 1.21 0.89 0.54 0.99 0.69 0.61 
FQ2 2016 0.27 0.69 0.33 0.31 0.32 0.55 0.15 1.12 1.22 0.88 0.58 1.00 0.64 0.64 
FQ3 2016 0.41 0.69 0.26 0.32 0.30 0.51 0.16 1.11 1.24 0.79 0.59 1.01 0.64 0.63 
FQ4 2016 0.40 0.68 0.26 0.32 0.28 0.50 0.18 1.11 1.27 0.80 0.59 0.98 0.64 0.63 
FQ1 2017 0.38 0.68 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.48 0.64 1.11 1.28 0.79 0.63 0.97 0.64 0.65 
FQ2 2017 0.38 0.69 0.35 0.29 0.30 0.48 0.68 1.10 1.28 0.78 0.63 0.97 0.64 0.66 
FQ3 2017 0.36 0.69 0.27 0.30 0.26 0.47 0.69 0.95 1.28 0.78 0.63 0.97 0.64 0.65 






Annex 2: Companies’ leverage ratios in the U.S. automotive industry 
t Ford Harley Volksw. Daimler BMW Toyota Honda Nissan Suzuki Subaru Mitsubishi Mazda 
FQ1 2007 1.01 0.48 0.80 0.81 0.76 0.62 0.61 0.70 0.64 0.66 0.83 0.77 
FQ2 2007 1.00 0.48 0.80 0.81 0.77 0.61 0.61 0.69 0.63 0.65 0.84 0.76 
FQ3 2007 1.00 0.52 0.79 0.73 0.76 0.62 0.61 0.69 0.62 0.63 0.84 0.75 
FQ4 2007 0.98 0.58 0.80 0.72 0.76 0.62 0.62 0.69 0.63 0.62 0.83 0.75 
FQ1 2008 0.98 0.59 0.77 0.72 0.75 0.62 0.61 0.68 0.61 0.62 0.83 0.75 
FQ2 2008 1.01 0.63 0.77 0.72 0.76 0.62 0.61 0.68 0.60 0.62 0.82 0.74 
FQ3 2008 1.02 0.65 0.77 0.75 0.77 0.62 0.61 0.68 0.60 0.61 0.80 0.75 
FQ4 2008 1.08 0.73 0.78 0.75 0.80 0.61 0.63 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.80 0.72 
FQ1 2009 1.08 0.74 0.79 0.76 0.81 0.62 0.63 0.68 0.61 0.62 0.80 0.73 
FQ2 2009 1.05 0.74 0.79 0.77 0.81 0.62 0.63 0.68 0.62 0.60 0.80 0.72 
FQ3 2009 1.04 0.76 0.79 0.76 0.80 0.62 0.64 0.70 0.63 0.62 0.81 0.73 
FQ4 2009 1.04 0.77 0.79 0.75 0.80 0.64 0.65 0.71 0.66 0.66 0.80 0.77 
FQ1 2010 1.03 0.80 0.78 0.76 0.81 0.64 0.64 0.70 0.64 0.69 0.81 0.78 
FQ2 2010 1.02 0.79 0.79 0.75 0.81 0.63 0.63 0.70 0.63 0.68 0.83 0.78 
FQ3 2010 1.01 0.78 0.77 0.74 0.79 0.64 0.62 0.70 0.63 0.69 0.83 0.73 
FQ4 2010 1.00 0.77 0.76 0.72 0.78 0.64 0.62 0.70 0.54 0.69 0.81 0.74 
FQ1 2011 0.99 0.75 0.76 0.71 0.77 0.64 0.61 0.69 0.54 0.68 0.83 0.73 
FQ2 2011 0.97 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.76 0.63 0.60 0.69 0.53 0.66 0.82 0.73 
FQ3 2011 0.96 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.78 0.63 0.60 0.69 0.52 0.64 0.82 0.73 
FQ4 2011 0.92 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.78 0.63 0.60 0.70 0.50 0.65 0.81 0.76 
FQ1 2012 0.91 0.73 0.75 0.72 0.77 0.63 0.59 0.68 0.50 0.65 0.81 0.77 
FQ2 2012 0.91 0.71 0.76 0.74 0.78 0.63 0.60 0.69 0.52 0.66 0.81 0.78 
FQ3 2012 0.90 0.73 0.75 0.74 0.78 0.63 0.60 0.69 0.52 0.66 0.81 0.81 
FQ4 2012 0.91 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.64 0.62 0.69 0.52 0.67 0.80 0.75 
FQ1 2013 0.91 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.63 0.60 0.69 0.52 0.66 0.79 0.74 
FQ2 2013 0.90 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.63 0.60 0.69 0.51 0.66 0.78 0.73 
FQ3 2013 0.90 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.61 0.70 0.50 0.65 0.77 0.74 
FQ4 2013 0.87 0.68 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.64 0.62 0.68 0.48 0.62 0.76 0.74 
FQ1 2014 0.87 0.68 0.74 0.75 0.74 0.64 0.61 0.68 0.47 0.60 0.74 0.73 
FQ2 2014 0.87 0.67 0.73 0.76 0.75 0.63 0.61 0.67 0.48 0.59 0.72 0.72 
FQ3 2014 0.87 0.67 0.74 0.76 0.75 0.63 0.62 0.69 0.47 0.57 0.70 0.70 
FQ4 2014 0.88 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.76 0.63 0.61 0.68 0.48 0.59 0.64 0.70 
FQ1 2015 0.88 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.78 0.63 0.60 0.68 0.46 0.57 0.63 0.68 
FQ2 2015 0.88 0.71 0.74 0.76 0.77 0.63 0.60 0.68 0.47 0.56 0.61 0.67 
FQ3 2015 0.88 0.76 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.63 0.61 0.69 0.45 0.53 0.60 0.65 
FQ4 2015 0.87 0.82 0.77 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.61 0.69 0.48 0.53 0.58 0.64 
FQ1 2016 0.88 0.82 0.77 0.76 0.74 0.63 0.60 0.69 0.45 0.51 0.55 0.63 
FQ2 2016 0.87 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.62 0.60 0.69 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.61 
2 
 
FQ3 2016 0.87 0.80 0.78 0.77 0.75 0.62 0.60 0.70 0.55 0.47 0.52 0.61 
FQ4 2016 0.88 0.81 0.77 0.76 0.75 0.62 0.61 0.70 0.56 0.48 0.52 0.62 
FQ1 2017 0.87 0.81 0.74 0.76 0.74 0.61 0.61 0.70 0.58 0.47 0.59 0.60 
FQ2 2017 0.87 0.80 0.75 0.75 0.73 0.60 0.60 0.71 0.58 0.47 0.64 0.59 
FQ3 2017 0.87 0.82 0.75 0.75 0.72 0.62 0.60 0.73 0.55 0.47 0.56 0.60 






Annex 3: Macroeconomic data 
t GDP CPI 
FQ1 2007 15493.328 86.2035 
FQ2 2007 15582.085 87.1798 
FQ3 2007 15666.738 87.7317 
FQ4 2007 15761.967 88.8078 
FQ1 2008 15671.383 89.7698 
FQ2 2008 15752.308 90.9376 
FQ3 2008 15667.032 92.3398 
FQ4 2008 15328.027 90.2250 
FQ1 2009 15155.940 89.6044 
FQ2 2009 15134.117 90.0809 
FQ3 2009 15189.222 90.8559 
FQ4 2009 15356.058 91.5673 
FQ1 2010 15415.145 91.7124 
FQ2 2010 15557.277 91.6801 
FQ3 2010 15671.967 91.9488 
FQ4 2010 15750.625 92.6934 
FQ1 2011 15712.754 93.6826 
FQ2 2011 15825.096 94.7478 
FQ3 2011 15820.700 95.3656 
FQ4 2011 16004.107 95.7937 
FQ1 2012 16129.418 96.3332 
FQ2 2012 16198.807 96.5365 
FQ3 2012 16220.667 96.9724 
FQ4 2012 16239.138 97.6172 
FQ1 2013 16382.964 98.0096 
FQ2 2013 16403.180 97.9023 
FQ3 2013 16531.685 98.4318 
FQ4 2013 16663.649 98.7957 
FQ1 2014 16621.696 99.4057 
FQ2 2014 16830.111 99.9250 
FQ3 2014 17033.572 100.1863 
FQ4 2014 17113.945 99.9589 
FQ1 2015 17254.744 99.2989 
FQ2 2015 17397.029 99.9556 
FQ3 2015 17438.802 100.3372 
FQ4 2015 17456.225 100.3673 
FQ1 2016 17523.374 100.3506 
FQ2 2016 17622.486 101.0274 
2 
 
FQ3 2016 17706.705 101.4898 
FQ4 2016 17784.185 102.1772 
FQ1 2017 17863.023 102.9247 
FQ2 2017 17995.150 102.9504 
FQ3 2017 18120.843 103.4933 
FQ4 2017 18223.758 104.3391 
 
